Introduction
The recent decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), Raipur Bench, in Smt. Lalita Devi v. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1, Korba (ITA No.718/RPR/2026) for Assessment Year 2019-20 represents a significant reaffirmation of the mandatory procedural safeguards governing reassessment under the Income Tax Act, 1961. The case, adjudicated by a Single Member Bench comprising Shri Partha Sarathi Chaudhury, Judicial Member, hinges on a precise interpretation of the statutory timeline prescribed under Section 148A(b). The Tribunal was tasked with determining whether a show cause notice that provided the assessee with only six clear days to respond, as opposed to the statutorily mandated minimum of seven days, could set in motion a valid reassessment proceeding. By quashing the notice as void ab initio and consequently annulling the assessment order, the ITAT has reinforced the principle that procedural requirements are not mere formalities but are jurisdictional prerequisites essential for the validity of any action taken by the Revenue.
Facts of the Case
The appellant, Smt. Lalita Devi, challenged the order passed by the Ld.CIT(Appeals)/NFAC, Delhi, dated 07.07.2026, which had upheld the reassessment proceedings initiated against her. The core legal contention raised by the Ld. Counsel for the assessee, Shri Yash Dhariwal, CA, was that the show cause notice issued under Section 148A(b) of the Act was violative of the provision itself. The specific grievance was that the notice did not provide a clear-cut seven-day period, excluding both the date of the notice and the date of compliance sought from the assessee.
The facts on record are precise and undisputed. The notice under Section 148A(b) was dated 24.02.2023, and the date fixed for compliance by the assessee was 03.03.2023. The Tribunal noted that between these two dates, there were only six clear days available to the assessee. The Revenue, represented by Shri Piyush Tripathi, Sr. DR, sought to defend the notice, but the Tribunal found that the statutory mandate of “not less than 7 days” had not been met. The appeal was heard and pronounced on 26.10.2026.
Reasoning and Legal Analysis
The reasoning of the Tribunal is the most critical aspect of this case, as it delves into the method of computing time limits in statutory notices and the consequences of non-compliance with mandatory provisions. The analysis can be broken down into several key components.
1. The Statutory Mandate and the Computation of Time
The Tribunal began by examining the language of Section 148A(b) of the Act, which explicitly requires that the assessee be given an opportunity of being heard by serving a notice to show cause “within such time, as may be specified in the notice being not less than seven days.” The pivotal question was how to compute this seven-day period. The assessee’s counsel argued that the phrase “not less than 7 days” necessitates a clear seven-day window, which can only be achieved by excluding both the date of issuance of the notice and the date by which compliance is sought.
The Tribunal found itself in agreement with this interpretation, relying on a wealth of judicial precedent. It referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pioneer Motors (Private) Ltd. vs. Municipal Council, Nagrecoil (AIR 1967 SC 684), which laid down the fundamental principle for computing time when a statute uses the phrase “not less than.” The Supreme Court held that when a period of “not less than” a certain number of days is prescribed, both the first day (the date of the notice) and the last day (the date of compliance) must be excluded from the computation. The Tribunal quoted the Supreme Court’s observation that “both the terminal days are excluded from the computation” when “not less than” so many days are to intervene.
2. Application of Precedent from High Courts
The ITAT did not act in isolation but grounded its reasoning in a consistent line of High Court decisions. It placed significant reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court in Bijendra Singh vs. PCCIT (2025) 478 ITR 493 (Raj). In that case, the High Court, following the Pioneer Motors precedent, held that for a notice under Section 148A(b), both terminal days must be excluded. The Rajasthan High Court had quashed a notice where the period fell short of seven days, and the ITAT found this reasoning directly applicable to the present case.
Furthermore, the Tribunal referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in PCCIT vs. Smt. Komarla Yogendra Keertana (2025) 307 Taxman 106 (Kar), which also held that where a notice under Section 148A(b) did not provide the assessee the minimum statutory period of seven days to respond, the notice was liable to be quashed. The ITAT also noted a similar view taken by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in Atul Mahavirprasad Paldecha vs. ITO (2025) 307 Taxman 331 (Guj). This consistent judicial interpretation across multiple High Courts fortified the Tribunal’s conclusion that the seven-day period is a mandatory requirement, not a directory one.
3. The “Void Ab Initio” Doctrine and Its Consequences
Having established that the notice dated 24.02.2023 provided only six clear days, the Tribunal concluded that the notice was invalid and bad in law. The critical legal consequence of this finding was the application of the doctrine of “void ab initio.” The Tribunal held that a notice that is non-compliant with the mandatory provisions of the Act is void from the very beginning. Such a notice cannot be the foundation for any valid legal proceeding.
The Tribunal explicitly stated that “such invalid, void ab initio notice cannot give rise to a valid assessment order.” Consequently, the assessment order passed in pursuance of this void notice was quashed. The Tribunal further declared that “all other subsequent proceedings are non-est as per law.” This means that the entire reassessment proceeding, from the issuance of the notice to the final assessment order, is legally non-existent and has no effect in the eyes of the law.
4. Consistency with the Tribunal’s Own Prior Rulings
The Tribunal also emphasized that this was not an isolated view but was consistent with its own recent decisions. It referred to its earlier rulings in DCIT-1(1), Raipur Vs. Avani Ferro Alloys Pvt. Ltd (ITA Nos.88 to 91/RPR/2025, dated 06.08.2026), Atal Agrawal Vs. ITO-1, Raigarh (ITA No.231/RPR/2026, dated 03.09.2026), and Kaizen Motoventures Private Limited Vs. ACIT-1(1), Raipur (ITA No. 409/RPR/2026, dated 22.09.2026). By following the “same parity of reasoning,” the Tribunal ensured uniformity in its interpretation of Section 148A(b), thereby providing certainty to taxpayers and the Revenue alike. The Revenue’s arguments were rejected, and the appeal of the assessee was allowed.
Conclusion
The ITAT Raipur’s decision in Smt. Lalita Devi is a landmark ruling that underscores the strict adherence required to the procedural timelines under Section 148A(b) of the Income Tax Act. By holding that the mandatory seven-day period must be computed by excluding both terminal dates, the Tribunal has set a clear and unambiguous standard. The ruling serves as a powerful reminder to the Revenue that the reassessment process is governed by a strict legal framework, and any deviation from the mandatory provisions, however minor it may seem, renders the entire proceeding void ab initio. For taxpayers, this judgment provides a robust defense against reassessment notices that do not strictly comply with the statutory requirements, reinforcing the principle that procedural safeguards are the bedrock of a fair and lawful tax administration.